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Abstract
The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which present-
day evidence-based medicine (EBM) assesses causal claims: according to EBM+,
mechanistic studies should be scrutinised alongside association studies. This
paper addresses two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not feasible in practice,
and (ii) that it is too malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that
need to be made in order to implement the procedure. Several responses to
these two worries are considered and evaluated. The paper also discusses the
question of whether we should have confidence in medical interventions, in the
light of Stegenga’s arguments for medical nihilism.
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§1
EBM and EBM+
Causal claims are central to medicine. All areas of medicine seek to establish such
claims: in basic medical science, claims about disease progression and the main-
tenance of health; in exposure assessment, claims about the effects of exposure to
chemicals or other agents; in intervention assessment, claims about the effects of
health interventions, for example. The idea underlying evidence-based medicine
(EBM) is to make the evidence for these causal claims explicit, and to make meth-
ods for evaluating that evidence explicit, in order to improve the reliability of the
assessment of causal claims:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious
use of current best evidence (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71).
However, the way EBM seeks to achieve this goal is by focussing on clini-
cal studies—particularly randomised controlled studies (RCTs)—and by excluding
other kinds of evidence or by viewing it as inherently low quality:
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clini-
cal experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for
clinical decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from
clinical research. (Guyatt et al., 1992, p. 2420)
1
The exclusion of ‘pathophysiologic rationale’—more generally, of mechanistic
evidence—conflicts with a recent line of research on the epistemology of causal-
ity. Russo and Williamson (2007) argued that to establish a causal claim in the
health sciences one should look for evidence of mechanisms as well as evidence of
correlation. This is because there are many possible explanations of an observed
correlation between variables A and B: one such explanation is that A is a cause
of B, but others are reverse causation, confounding, chance, or other relationships
between A and B, such as semantic, constitutive, logical, physical and mathemat-
ical relationships (Williamson, 2019a, §1.2). What is distinctive about the former,
causal, explanation is that there is some mechanism complex linking A to B by
which instances of A explain instances of B and which gives rise to the observed
correlation. Hence evidence of mechanisms is crucial to establishing causality.
Fig. 1 provides a visual representation of this epistemology of causality. As-
sociation studies are studies which test for an association between A and B; these
include both experimental and observational studies and encompass studies in clin-
ical medicine as well as epidemiological studies of disease, and systematic reviews
and meta-analyses of such studies. Association studies usually test whether A and
B are probabilistically dependent, conditional on other potential causes of B. Such
studies provide direct evidence of a correlation via the confirmatory channel C1.
Within the class of association studies, RCTs are prized by proponents of present-
day EBM because they can reduce the risk of confounding by unforeseen causes
of B, so they can provide some indirect evidence of the existence of a mechanism
of action (C2). A more direct way of confirming the presence of a mechanism of
action is by confirming specific mechanism hypotheses, which posit features of a
possible mechanism complex linking A and B (M2). Mechanistic studies test these
hypotheses (M1). In some cases, established specific mechanism hypotheses can also
confirm or undermine the presence of a posited correlation (M3)—see Williamson
(2019a, §2.2) on this point.
This approach, then, motivates the systematic evaluation of mechanistic studies
alongside association studies when assessing a causal claim in medicine. Parkkinen
et al. (2018) provide a set of general procedures for performing this evaluation
and call this approach ‘EBM+’. Although EBM+ very much fits the spirit of EBM,
because it seeks to make evidence and its evaluation explicit and systematic, it
flies in the face of the actual practice of present-day EBM, which, as we have seen,
devalues mechanistic studies. Parkkinen et al. (2018) view present-day EBM as a
first approximation to correct evidence evaluation, with the scrutiny of mechanistic
studies a further step along the path—hence the ‘+’ in ‘EBM+’. Note that EBM+
is intended to be applicable throughout medicine, which is broadly construed to
include the health sciences as well as clinical practice, because it is based on a
general thesis about how to establish causal claims. While Fig. 1 depicts evidential
relations when assessing causation in a target population, the EBM+ programme
also has a set of procedures for assessing whether claims based on studies carried
out on a different source population can be extrapolated to the target population
(Parkkinen et al., 2018).
The above view of the epistemology of causality has been the object of some
controversy in the literature (see Williamson, 2019a, §1), and there are many who
continue to agree with Guyatt et al. (1992) that mechanistic evidence should be
‘de-emphasized’ or ignored. For example, The Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based
Medicine still (as of 2020) places mechanism-based reasoning at the bottom of its
evidence hierarchy (OCEBM Levels of Evidence Working Group, 2011), and Miriam
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Figure 1: Evidential relationships for establishing a causal claim (Williamson, 2018).
Solomon holds that
Mechanistic reasoning (or “mechanistic evidence”) does not play a role
in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of new interventions (Solomon,
2015, p. 132).
We will not revisit the rationale behind EBM+ in this paper, as it has been widely
discussed elsewhere.1 Instead we will focus on two new challenges for EBM+. One
worry is that the systematic consideration of mechanistic studies may simply not
be feasible—a worry that we consider in §2. Another concern is that EBM+ may
be prone to manipulation by subjective influences, which we consider in §3. Finally,
in §4, we discuss some consequences of our findings for Jacob Stegenga’s claim that
one should have little confidence in the effectiveness of medical interventions.
§2
The feasibility of EBM+
One question that immediately faces the EBM+ programme is its feasibility. It is
hard enough to systematically assess association studies, which are well indexed in
databases and which are amenable to standardised statistical analysis. Mechanistic
studies, however, are very heterogeneous and are not in general well indexed. Is it
really practical to systematically evaluate mechanistic studies alongside association
studies?2
1See Williamson (2019a, §1) for references. The EBM+ programme is very much in line with the
efforts of Cartwright and Hardie (2012) to improve evidence evaluation in evidence-based policy.
2Howick (2011, §10.4), for example, expresses doubts about feasibility on the grounds that mechanis-
tic evidence is usually too incomplete, or the mechanisms themselves too complex, to be able to usefully
consider mechanistic evidence. La Caze (2019, §3.2) also presents a feasibility-related challenge, namely
that of spelling out how evidence of complex mechanisms can inform extrapolation inferences.
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The obvious way to meet this feasibility challenge is to provide a good example
of evidence assessment in medicine that appeals to EBM+ or something like it and
that is clearly feasible. In this section we shall investigate whether such an example
is to be found and, if so, where it is to be found.
Intervention assessment. It turns out that there are very few examples of the system-
atic and explicit evaluation of mechanistic evidence when assessing claims about
the effectiveness of interventions.
One potential example is the umbrella review (i.e., review of systematic re-
views and meta-analyses) of Posadzki et al. (2018), who assess effects of melatonin
on health. They consider mechanistic evidence alongside association studies and
formulate and evaluate specific mechanism hypotheses. However, their review of
mechanism hypotheses is limited to the goal of identifying potential mechanisms
of action; they do not integrate the conclusions of their analysis of the mechanism
hypotheses with the results of their analysis of association studies in order to come
up with an assessment of the causal claim based on all the evidence. Thus this
study cannot be said to implement the EBM+ approach in its entirety. Nevertheless,
they show that it is feasible to perform a systematic review in order to identify a
range of specific mechanism hypotheses, which is an important component of the
EBM+ programme.
Another potential example is the assessment of a pegylated combination ther-
apy of peginterferon alfa and ribavirin for the treatment of chronic Hepatitis C,
which led to its recommendation as the optimal treatment. Auker-Howlett and
Wilde (2019) show that the reasoning that justified this recommendation can only
be understood by means of the conceptual apparatus of Fig. 1. This is because nei-
ther association studies on their own nor mechanistic studies on their own provided
grounds for the recommendation: only when association and mechanistic studies
are considered in combination with one another is the recommendation warranted.
While their argument is compelling, it shows only that one needs the conceptual
apparatus of EBM+ in order to account for intervention assessment here—it does
not show that the detailed procedural recommendations of EBM+ are feasible. This
is because the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), who
issued the recommendation about the treatment, cited only association studies in
support of their recommendation (NICE, 2010), in accordance with EBM procedure
but not with EBM+ procedure.3 (Given the arguments of Auker-Howlett and Wilde
(2019), the association studies on their own should not have been taken to establish
effectiveness, and EBM+ procedure would have recommended a review of mecha-
nistic studies on this occasion.) Thus, we must search elsewhere for evidence of the
feasibility of the full EBM+ programme.
Disease assessment. Mechanistic evidence is routinely considered in disease assess-
ment: there is often some integration of mechanistic considerations with the as-
sessment of epidemiological studies in order to obtain an overall assessment of a
claim about disease causation. However, this integration can be rather haphazard.
To give an example, reviews that assessed whether Zika virus causes birth defects
considered mechanistic evidence in several different ways (Williamson, 2018). Frank
et al. (2016) used the well-known Hill indicators of causality to assess teratogenicity
(see Table 1): these indicators include ‘Plausibility’ and ‘Coherence’ which assess
3However, there may have been some undisclosed mechanistic reasoning. See §4 on this point.
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Table 1: The causal indicators of Hill (1965).
Strength Strength of the observed association
Consistency Consistency of the observed association
Specificity A narrowly defined cause and effect (disease), and the cause
is not associated with other diseases
Temporality The putative cause occurs before early stages of the disease
Biological
gradient
A dose-response curve
Plausibility Plausible given the biological knowledge of the day
Coherence No conflict with the known history and biology of the disease
Experiment Confirming experimental evidence
Analogy Similar effects of similar causes
fit of the causal claim to mechanistic considerations. Rasmussen et al. (2016), on
the other hand, used Shepard’s indicators, which are tailored specifically to the
assessment of teratogenicity and which include a single indicator involving fit to
established mechanisms. Meanwhile Krauer et al. (2017) used an ad-hoc set of
indicators, which included biological plausibility. None of these systems specifies
exactly how the various indicators combine and different reviews came to different
conclusions about teratogenicity. In sum, then, while these reviews do support the
claim that the routine assessment of mechanistic consideration is feasible, they are
far from exemplars of the full EBM+ programme, which seeks a more systematic
integration of evidence.
Exposure assessment. The assessment of the effects of exposures provides a more
fruitful hunting ground for evidence of the feasibility of EBM+. In particular, the
new (2019) methods of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
for evaluating the carcinogenicity of various agents, presented in IARC (2019a) and
Samet et al. (2019), are very much in line with EBM+. Fig. 2 provides an EBM+-style
conceptualisation of the evidential relationships in IARC’s procedure. IARC sep-
arately assesses exposure studies, human studies, animal studies and mechanistic
studies and then integrates these assessments to come up with an overall evaluation
of carcinogenicity. Human studies encompass epidemiological studies on humans;
these provide direct evidence of correlation and indirect evidence of the existence
of a mechanism of action, as portrayed in Fig. 1. Similarly, mechanistic studies are
used to directly test specific mechanism hypotheses: IARC have developed a list
of ten key characteristics of carcinogens and mechanistic studies are used to deter-
mine which of these characteristics, if any, is present in mechanisms involving the
agent in question. Additionally, animal studies provide indirect evidence of both
correlation and mechanism in humans, as long as the relevant animal and human
mechanisms are sufficiently similar—a judgement that is informed by mechanistic
studies (Wilde and Parkkinen, 2019).
As a recent example of the procedural aspects of IARC evaluations, consider the
evaluation of the carcinogenicity of three chemicals, namely styrene, styrene-7-8-
oxide and quinolene, which took place on 20–27 March 2018 and which culminated
in the monograph IARC (2019b). Including those responsible for the evaluation,
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Figure 2: Evidential relationships for IARC’s evaluations (Williamson, 2019b).
members of IARC who assisted the evaluation, and invited specialists, the subgroup
charged with analysing exposure data had 6 members, the subgroup assessing hu-
man studies had 10 members, that assessing animal studies had 4 members, and
that assessing mechanistic studies had 15 members. The size of each subgroup re-
flects the range of expertise required for that component of the evaluation. Before
the evaluation meeting, roughly a year’s preparation went into organising the meet-
ing, selecting the studies for review, and producing an initial review of the material
by the working group members. At the review meeting itself, the subgroups met
separately for the first four days in order to assess the evidence in their category
for each of the three chemicals. All subgroups then came together to integrate the
individual assessments and generate an overall evaluation of the carcinogenicity of
each of the three chemicals—this phase of the procedure took approximately three
days. After the meeting, participants worked for over a year to finalise the resulting
publication of the assessment, IARC (2019b). This gives an indication of the scale
of the enterprise. That it is feasible and reliable is witnessed by the fact that IARC
has conducted over a thousand evaluations to date, and that IARC evaluations are
relied on around the world to influence public health policies that restrict exposure
to carcinogens.
That IARC evaluations are broadly in line with EBM+ procedure can also be
seen with the aid of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, which characterise the EBM+ approach to
evaluating efficacy and external validity respectively. In the context of an IARC
evaluation, the efficacy question asks whether the agent under review is a cause of
cancer in humans, while the external validity question asks whether the conclusions
from animal studies extrapolate to humans. Consider Fig. 3 first. If human studies
suffice to establish or rule out carcinogenicity, then, according to IARC procedure,
carcinogenicity is decided and the results of the assessment of mechanistic studies
do not bear on the overall evaluation. Otherwise, the IARC classification of car-
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Figure 3: EBM+ procedure for assessing efficacy (Parkkinen et al., 2018, §3.3).
cinogenicity is influenced by their assessment of specific mechanistic hypotheses—
the 10 key characteristics of carcinogens—and their systemic review of mechanistic
studies that are relevant to these hypotheses. The subgroup responsible for assess-
ing mechanistic studies then assesses whether these characteristics are present and
whether there is strong mechanistic evidence overall, i.e., whether there is strong
evidence arising from mechanistic studies for the claim that there is a mechanism
of action. Thus far, IARC procedure is perfectly in line with EBM+. EBM+ then
suggests that one should explicitly consider whether human and animal studies
provide strong indirect evidence that there is a mechanism of action, in order to
determine the status of the general mechanistic claim, and that the status of the
overall carcinogenicity claim tracks the status of whichever of the correlation and
mechanism claims is weaker. It is here that IARC procedure departs slightly from
that of EBM+ (Parkkinen et al., 2018, Chapter 8): IARC’s method for determin-
ing the overall evaluation is rather more intricate, and, according to Williamson
(2019b), has certain limitations. Despite these minor differences, IARC procedure
is very close to that of EBM+. Fig. 4 tells a similar story: for IARC, the role of
animal studies depends on how decisive they are in determining carcinogenicity in
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Figure 4: EBM+ procedure for assessing external validity (Parkkinen et al., 2018,
§3.3).
the experimental animals and how similar the putative mechanisms of action are in
animals and humans, which is in accord with the EBM+ approach of Fig. 4.
Overall, then, the feasibility of IARC procedure supports the feasibility of the
EBM+ approach. IARC clearly show that it is possible to search for and assess
mechanistic studies in a systematic way, and to integrate this assessment with those
of epidemiological studies in humans and animal studies to determine an overall
evaluation. All this requires effort: a working group tasked with assessing mechanis-
tic evidence. But this effort is proportionate to that expended on the assessment of
human and animal studies. Furthermore, EBM+ procedure imposes a lower burden
than IARC procedure, because EBM+ recommends a full evaluation of mechanistic
studies only where association studies on their own fail to establish causation (see
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4), while IARC evaluate mechanistic studies even in situations where
this evaluation cannot influence the overall assessment of carcinogenicity.
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To summarise, evidence of the feasibility of EBM+ is hard to find in the areas of
intervention assessment and disease assessment, but there is good evidence arising
from IARC practice in exposure assessment. Although evidence of the feasibility of
EBM+ is strongest in the area of exposure assessment, the domain of application of
EBM+ is not restricted to exposure assessment. EBM+ offers a general methodology
for assessing causation in medicine, and its feasibility for exposure assessment
supports its feasibility for intervention assessment, disease assessment, and indeed
basic medical science.
While the number and quality of relevant mechanistic studies will vary from
area to area, IARC practice shows that, in an area where there are often very many
relevant mechanistic studies, it is feasible to search for and assess these studies, and
to integrate that assessment with assessments of other studies in order to determine
the overall status of a causal claim of interest.
That EBM+ is feasible in exposure assessment carries directly over to disease
assessment. Of course, diseases caused by infectious agents rather than chemi-
cal exposures require considering studies of mechanisms of infection and of the
body’s defences against infection, rather than studies of metabolism of chemicals
and the effects of resulting metabolites. However, IARC already routinely considers
infectious causes of cancer, and no new feasibility concerns arise there.
Let us turn next to intervention assessment. Intervention assessment differs
from disease assessment insofar as experimental studies become more practical
when assessing the effects of an intervention. This complicates the evaluation of
association studies. However, it does not significantly complicate the evaluation
of mechanistic studies. One will often need to consider mechanisms of compliance
with the intervention in addition to the mechanism of action of the intervention and
any counteracting mechanisms. However, mechanisms of compliance are analogous
to mechanisms of exposure in exposure assessment, and these are routinely con-
sidered in some detail by IARC, for example, so no new concerns about feasibility
emerge.
Thus the feasibility of IARC assessments supports the feasibility of EBM+ in
both disease and intervention assessment, in addition to exposure assessment.
§3
The malleability of EBM+
Stegenga (2018) argues forcefully that the methods of present-day EBM are mal-
leable, in the sense that their implementation requires many subjective choices and
this makes their results prone to influence by interested parties. The worry arises
that the methods of EBM+, which require the assessment of mechanistic studies in
addition to the assessment of association studies mandated by EBM, will be even
more malleable. If so, its malleability would be a serious objection to EBM+.4
Stegenga argues that the malleability of present-day EBM stems from a range
of problems with association studies which leave them open to bias and fraud. The
aim of this section is not to defend EBM from these criticisms, but to investigate
whether EBM+ is more or less prone to malleability than EBM. Our approach will
4Howick (2019, p. 178), for example, expresses concerns about malleability. He criticises EBM+
for not focussing on the problem of financial biases, saying, ‘by ignoring the problem, they cannot
possibly solve it.’ The extensive literature on values in science reinforces concerns about malleability—
see Douglas (2009); Teira and Reiss (2013); Andreoletti and Teira (2019) and Holman (2019) for example.
Gillies (2019a) responds to Holman’s concerns about EBM+.
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Figure 5: The Bayesian network formalisation of Hill’s indicators of Landes et al.
(2018).
again to be to consider various possible responses to this objection, in order to
determine whether EBM+ can offer a viable defence.
Formalisation. One might attempt to respond to the malleability worry by devel-
oping a formal framework for EBM+, in the hope that formalisation reduces the
scope for subjective influence. That this is not a promising strategy, however, can
be seen from efforts to formalise Hill’s indicators of causality, depicted in Table 1.
As we saw above, Hill’s approach takes mechanistic considerations into account, but
Hill does not specify exactly how to tell when an indicator is present, nor how to
integrate evidence arising from multiple indicators (Hill, 1965), leaving his approach
open to the charge of malleability. There have been some interesting attempts to
formalise Hill’s approach in order to reduce malleability.
One line of work here is the E-synthesis approach of Landes et al. (2018), which
formalises Hill’s indicators by means of the Bayesian network framework. Fig. 5
represents the graph of such a network. The node at the top refers to the causal
hypothesis. At the next level down there are variables related to Hill’s indicators: ∆
refers to difference making, PD to probabilistic dependence, DR to dose-response
relationship, RoG to rate of growth, M to mechanisms, T to temporality, and so
on. Each indicator is connected to an evidence report (REP) variable for every item
of evidence that bears on that indicator (although only one such variable for each
indicator is depicted in Fig. 5). Each evidence report variable is in turn connected
to two further variables denoting the relevance, RLV, and reliability, REL, of that
evidence report. A Bayesian network also requires the probability distribution of
each variable conditional on its parent variables in the graph. These, according
to Landes et al. (2018, p. 33), should be based on domain knowledge elicited from
experts. It is here that the malleability problem emerges. Domain knowledge is
very unlikely to fully determine all these probability parameters, and decisions will
need to be made as to how to fill in the gaps. Bias and fraud can enter the picture
here, and will be all the harder to detect because of the complexity of the formal
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framework. One might attempt to elicit the probability distributions themselves
from experts, but this is a big ask. Moreover, different experts are likely to pro-
vide very different probability distributions, because experts have radically differing
views about the relative importance of Hill’s indicators, and because many variables
denote epistemological qualities—reliability and relevance—which domain experts
are not used to quantifying. Hence, regardless of the merits of the E-synthesis
approach, there remains plenty of scope for subjective influence and this approach
is unlikely to help with the specific problem of malleability.
Swaen and van Amelsvoort (2009) also attempt to formalise Hill’s indicators in
order to reduce the influence of subjectivity when deciding how the various indi-
cators should be weighed. They appeal to a ‘weight-of-evidence’ approach (Weed,
2005), which requires quantifying the extent to which each of Hill’s indicators is
met and quantifying the relative importance of each indicator. Instead of eliciting
these weights from experts, which would be susceptible to the objections offered
above, Swaen and van Amelsvoort (2009) try to learn the parameters of the model
from a dataset consisting of past IARC evaluations of the carcinogenicity of var-
ious exposures. The problem with this approach is that their assessment of the
extent to which past IARC classifications exhibit each of Hill’s indicators is rather
arbitrary—certainly there is room for subjective disagreement there. Moreover, it
is not clear how the resulting model can be reliably extrapolated to future IARC
classifications, let alone to the assessment of interventions. This is because cer-
tain model assumptions appear very questionable: for example, it is assumed that
weights of indicators combine linearly and do not vary from context to context.
Thus formalisation offers little scope for ameliorating malleability. Whether one
attempts to elicit model parameters from experts or to learn them from data, sub-
jective judgements play an important role. Introducing strong model assumptions
offers one way of reducing the number of free parameters that are open to subjective
influence. However, this tactic merely threatens to trade malleability for unreliabil-
ity, and in any case, model assumptions are themselves open to disagreement.
Quantity of evidence. A more promising response to the malleability objection notes
that increasing the quantity of evidence tends to reduce subjective influence. The
general idea is that if evidence E makes some set CE of conclusions rationally
permissible, where different subjective choices along the way can lead to differ-
ent conclusions, then additional evidence F is likely to lead to a smaller, rather
than larger, set CEF of rationally permissible conclusions. In our context, the
conclusions relate to a proposition of the form A is a cause of B. If we take E
to be evidence from association studies and F evidence from mechanistic studies,
this phenomenon suggests that the influence of subjectivity is likely to be reduced,
rather than increased, by taking mechanistic studies into account.
In a Bayesian framework, where CE might represent a set of rationally permis-
sible degrees of belief in the proposition that A is a cause of B, this phenomenon
is called the ‘washing-out of priors’ and is made precise by means of a range of
convergence-of-opinion theorems (see, e.g., Dorling, 1975, §11; Dorling and Edg-
ington, 1976). Under certain conditions, one can guarantee that a set of rational
degrees of belief will converge to a single rational degree of belief as the quantity
of evidence increases. However, these conditions are somewhat idealistic and there
is room for debate about the extent to which they are met in practice (Earman,
1992, Chapter 6). Moreover, even if they are met, they provide no guarantee that
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the influence of subjectivity will reduce in the short term. Indeed, there are many
intriguing cases of ‘dilation’, where learning something new can enlarge the set of
permissible degrees of belief.5
Regardless of these challenges, there must be something of substance to the
general phenomenon, for otherwise there would be no advantage to gathering more
evidence. The upshot is that one should expect EBM+ to reduce, rather than
increase, malleability, in comparison to EBM. To suggest otherwise would require
some reason for thinking that mechanistic and association studies together are
particularly likely to lead to dilation. However, the opposite appears to be the case,
as we shall now see.
Variety of evidence. An even more promising response to the malleability objection
appeals to the potential for diverse evidence to reduce subjective influence.6 As
noted above, causal inference is beset by the problem that an observed correlation
has a wide range of potential explanations, including bias and confounding, and
that one can only establish causation where these other potential explanations can
be ruled out. Association studies can provide some evidence against these alterna-
tive explanations. But, as Stegenga argues, association studies are prone to error
and bias and are malleable. The standard view is that where the existing associ-
ation studies are inconclusive, more association studies are called for. However,
further association studies are prone to the same kinds of errors, biases and mal-
leability as the original association studies. Just as independent witnesses are given
more weight than witnesses with common interests and similar flaws, studies with
different designs and carried out by teams with different interests would be more
helpful.
Mechanistic studies are just such studies. Mechanistic studies tend to be much
more heterogeneous than association studies and typically involve methods other
than those used by association studies, such as in vitro lab work, biomedical imag-
ing, autopsies, animal experiments and simulations. Defects of these different kinds
of study are independent of defects of association studies and of each other. They
are often conducted by research teams with different interests to those who carry
out association studies (which tend to be carried out by drug companies seeking
approval for lucrative new drugs). Thus publication bias, fraud, and industry ma-
nipulation are less of a concern for mechanistic studies than for association studies.
To be sure, the teams carrying out mechanistic studies do have interests, but these
interests tend to differ.7
To some extent, then, association studies and mechanistic studies act as inde-
pendent witnesses—certainly more so than do association studies and yet more
association studies. Scrutinising and evaluating both kinds of study can only help
to diminish the scope of malleability and error.
Reinforcing evidence. While the quantity- and variety-of-evidence responses go
some way towards addressing concerns about malleability, more can be said. There
is an important sense in which association studies and mechanistic studies have
5See Zhang et al. (2018) for a recent discussion of the relation between dilation and disagreement.
6Again, there are Bayesian explications of this phenomenon (e.g., Landes, 2020), but again, there
are exceptions to the general phenomenon.
7This is of course not to say that interests never coincide, nor that bias, fraud and industry manip-
ulation are never a concern for mechanistic studies. See Fugh-Berman (2013); Green (2015) and Conradi
and Joffe (2017) on this point.
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complementary strengths. As we have observed, association studies on their own
can be unreliable indicators of causality because of biases, unforeseen confound-
ing etc. Mechanistic studies help to address precisely these deficiencies: they tell
us about potential confounders and help to determine whether a correlation is
genuinely causal. On the other hand, mechanistic studies on their own can be un-
reliable indicators of causality in two ways: (i) it can be hard to determine from a
complex mechanism whether the putative cause actually makes a difference to the
putative effect (the ‘problem of complexity’); (ii) there may be unforeseen counter-
acting mechanisms which cancel out the influence of some positive mechanism of
action (the ‘problem of masking’). Association studies ameliorate both these prob-
lems: (i) they can be used to demonstrate the existence of a net association across
the mechanism as a whole, showing that the cause does make a difference to the
effect; (ii) a positive association provides evidence that unforeseen counteracting
mechanisms do not fully cancel out the mechanism of action.
Thus association studies and mechanistic studies are not fully independent wit-
nesses: they are better than independent witnesses, because they make up for one
another’s deficiencies. From an epistemological point of view, association studies
and mechanistic studies reinforce each other—their combined evidential value is
more than the sum of the parts. The case study of Auker-Howlett and Wilde (2019),
discussed above, shows this reinforcing in action. This epistemological reinforcing
can be expected to further reduce the influence of subjectivity.
Practice. So far, we have seen that formalisation offers little scope for address-
ing malleability, but that we should nevertheless expect EBM+ to be less prone to
malleability than EBM because association and mechanistic studies offer a greater
quantity and variety of evidence and they reinforce one another. Actual practice
supports this claim. Abdin et al. (2019) consider evaluations of amoxicillin as a
cause of drug reaction with eosinophilia and systemic symptoms (DRESS). This is
a case in which considering mechanistic studies offers to be particularly promis-
ing: there is too little evidence from association studies for an informative EBM
evaluation, because these adverse drug reactions are extremely rare and can take
many years to materialise. The authors apply both the EBM+ approach and the
E-synthesis approach that we encountered above. They demonstrate inter-tool
agreement: they show that the two approaches yield similar conclusions, namely
that mechanistic evidence lends further support to the claim that amoxicillin is a
cause of DRESS, but not enough support to establish the claim.
We have already seen that IARC’s current approach to evaluation is very close
to the EBM+ approach. Anecdotally at least, there seems to be little inter-assessor
variability in assessments of mechanistic studies carried out by the mechanistic
subgroup of an IARC evaluation. There is certainly no evidence that subjectiv-
ity has a significant influence on overall evaluations. Simple structural features of
IARC’s methodology help to avoid malleability. Firstly, potential financial conflicts
of interest are taken very seriously. (It sometimes happens that an assessor is re-
moved from a working group in the middle of a review meeting, when a potential
conflict of interest is found.) Second, scientists are not permitted to evaluate their
own studies, so there is less scope for intellectual conflicts of interest to influence
proceedings. Third, the IARC secretariat work very hard to ensure consistency
across evaluations, by ensuring that assessors are aware of normal standards by
which judgements of strength of evidence are made, and by adopting a very formu-
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laic procedure for integrating subgroup assessments in order to converge upon an
overall assessment of carcinogenicity. Malleability is kept in check in practice.8
Malleability is an understandable worry, given problems faced by EBM in the
assessment of association studies. However, we have seen that there are several good
reasons for thinking that a move to EBM+ will mitigate, rather than amplify, the
effects of subjective choices during the assessment procedure.9 While more clearly
needs to be done to test for malleability in EBM+, concerns about malleability are
certainly not grounds for choosing EBM over EBM+.
§4
Discussion
We have seen that EBM+ can be defended against two charges: that is it unfeasible
and that it is malleable.
While there is limited evidence of feasibility in the areas of intervention and
disease assessment, there is good evidence of feasibility arising from IARC practice
in exposure assessment. Moreover, the feasibility of EBM+ in one area of practice
supports its feasibility in other areas: assessing causality is a general problem that
transcends these rather arbitrary distinctions between kinds of practice. Indeed, the
lessons learned here apply beyond medicine. For example, Shan and Williamson
(2020) argue that the basic epistemological framework underpinning EBM+, namely
a particular form of epistemological pluralism, can also be applied to the social
sciences, including to evidence-based policy (EBP), which leads to EBP+, and to
basic social sciences research, where the framework can be viewed as providing
foundations for mixed-methods research.
With regard to malleability, we have seen that there are general epistemological
reasons for thinking that subjective influences are likely to be diminished by con-
sidering mechanistic studies alongside association studies, and that actual practice
suggests that malleability is not a substantial problem for EBM+. (Again, the gen-
eral epistemological considerations carry over to the social sciences.) This is not
to suggest that EBM+ eradicates the need for personal judgement—judgements of
quality of study, for example, are required by both EBM and EBM+. The claim is
that by considering mechanistic studies in addition to association studies, one has
more evidence to go on, more varied evidence, and evidence that makes up for
the deficiencies of other evidence, so there is less scope for any malleability with
respect to individual judgements to influence the final assessment of causality.
Stegenga (2018) appeals to the malleability of EBM to argue for medical nihilism:
the claim that almost all medical interventions are ineffective. His argument can be
put roughly as follows: medical interventions are approved on the basis of EBM
assessments; EBM assessments are riddled with problems, such as malleability,
8Far from being malleable, Williamson (2019b) argues that, if anything, IARC evaluations are not
flexible enough to cope with exceptional cases.
9Recall that Howick (2019, p. 178) criticises EBM+ for not focussing on the problem of financial
biases. We have seen above that the diversity of evidence considered by EBM+ helps to ameliorate this
problem. Coupling that progress with a healthy scepticism towards research carried out by researchers or
organisations with potential financial conflicts of interest, and a strategy for avoiding evidence appraisers
with potential financial conflicts of interest, goes a long way towards solving the problem. Thus EBM+
is on a better footing than EBM with respect to financial biases.
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which weaken the link between effectiveness and approval; so we should have low
confidence that an approved medical intervention is effective.
What should we make of Stegenga’s argument? At least two considerations urge
caution. First, Stegenga appeals to Bayesianism to formalise his argument. Now,
as we have seen, Bayesian explications of scientific confirmation are themselves
prone to malleability: one can easily take issue with Stegenga’s claims about the
probabilities that feature in his explication and reach different conclusions, as Gillies
(2019b) explains. Thus there is a sense in which Stegenga’s focus on malleability is
self-undermining.
Second, one can take issue with the first premise of Stegenga’s argument: that
medical interventions are approved on the basis of EBM assessments. Certainly,
intervention approval panels almost always claim to come to their judgements by
means of the methods of present-day EBM. Certainly, the methods of present-day
EBM—especially the assessment of RCTs and meta-analyses and systematic reviews
of RCTs—inform their judgements. But their judgements tend not to wholly comply
with the principles of present-day EBM. Typically, analyses of RCTs, meta-analyses
and systematic reviews are presented to approval panels, and then a general in-
formal discussion ensues—which often encompasses mechanisms of action, com-
pliance and adverse effects—before a judgement is made. Panel members give
opinions about the plausibility of the underlying mechanisms, and this plausibility
informs the resulting judgement about whether the intervention should be approved.
This part of the process does not accord with EBM, which, as we noted in §1, holds
that mechanistic reasoning and expert opinion should be given little or no weight
in comparison to RCTs. So the approval process does not altogether follow the
precepts of EBM.
That intervention approval departs from the precepts of EBM undermines Ste-
genga’s argument for medical nihilism. This is because the point of departure is
with regard to mechanistic hypotheses, and this shifts the approval process in the
direction of EBM+. That in practice approval panels explicitly evaluate association
studies and consider mechanistic hypotheses in an implicit, common-sensical way
lends some confidence to the process, because it is a step in the direction of EBM+.
In order to cast doubt on the approval process, Stegenga would need to undermine
what takes place in practice, i.e., this common-sensical hybrid, which we might call
EBM±.
This is not to put the approval process beyond criticism. It would obviously be
better if, instead of an informal discussion of mechanisms guided by the expertise
and interests of the panel members who happen to be on the panel, mechanistic ev-
idence were systematically scrutinised and its assessment systematically integrated
with that of correlational evidence. As we saw in §1, the guiding principle under-
lying both EBM and EBM+ is that it is largely by making the evidence and the
appraisal process explicit and systematic that one can improve the reliability of
resulting judgements; there is clearly much more to be done here with respect to
the practice of intervention approval.10 However, the further one moves towards
EBM+, the more confidence one can have in judgements made on the basis of
evidence appraisals.
10Moving further towards EBM+ requires some changes to the infrastructure of evidence evaluation,
to ensure that mechanistic evidence is systematically considered and integrated with evidence of corre-
lation. But, as we have seen in the case of IARC, this infrastructure is of the same kind as that required
to evaluate association studies. See Aronson et al. (2018, §12) on this point, in relation to the assessment
of mechanistic evidence for drug approval.
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